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from the Penn World Tables.1 For 
2004, the most recent year for which 
this measure exists, there are data 
on per capita GDP for 82 countries. 
Aside from Luxembourg, which is 
anomalous, the richest fifth in this 
group have an average income per 
capita of $32,142.2  The poorest fifth 
have an average income per capita 
of only $1,422.  Thus, the 16 poorest 
countries for which we have data for 
2004 have an average income that 
is 23 times less than that of the 16 
richest countries. This means that the 
typical person living in these poorer 
countries must survive on $4 each 
day. In the absence of government 
subsidies, it is difficult to imagine how 
an individual could buy enough food 
and shelter in the U.S. to survive with 
this income.  
What makes some countries 
relatively rich while others are 
unimaginably poor?  More generally, 
what are the determinants of income 
per person in an economy, and why 
are these inputs allocated so unevenly 
across the world? Why are some 
countries always at the bottom of the 
tables, while others rapidly close the 
gap between themselves and richer 
nations? We are compelled to ask 
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1 The Penn World Tables, prepared by Alan 
Heston, Robert Summers, and Bettina Aten, 
facilitate cross-country comparisons by calculat-
ing real GDP per capita for a large set of coun-
tries using a common set of international prices.  
It is widely used for cross-country comparisons 
because it assigns the same value to any particu-
lar commodity or service regardless of country.
2 Luxembourg is anomalous not only because of 
its size but also because its income per capita, 
$54,285, is far beyond that of the rest of the rich 
world.  The next richest country, the United 
States, has an income per capita of $39,535.
iving standards, as measured by average 
income per person, vary widely across 
countries.  Differences in income result in 
large disparities in spending on goods and 
services by people living in different economies. What 
makes some countries rich and others poor? Furthermore, 
what determines income per person in a country, and why 
are these factors unevenly allocated across the world? In 
this article, Aubhik Khan outlines a framework for growth 
accounting to account for cross-country differences in 
income. The current consensus is that differences in per 
capita income across countries don’t arise primarily from 
differences in the quantities of capital or labor, but rather 
from differences in the efficiency with which these factors 
are used. 
Living standards, as captured 
by average income per person, vary 
dramatically across countries. These 
differences in income result in large 
disparities in spending on goods and 
services by people living in different 
economies. The typical person in 
a poor country has not only less 
consumption of food and housing but 
also less education and poorer health, 
when compared with a typical person 
living in a rich country. There are also 
sharp differences in life expectancy 
and infant mortality between rich 
and poor countries, both falling with 
income per capita.  
In an effort to illustrate the 
magnitude of these differences in 
income, let’s examine real gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita 
using the cross-country data available 12   Q1  2009 Business Review   www.philadelphiafed.org
such questions because their answers 
might give policymakers a chance to 
implement a dramatic improvement in 
living standards in poorer countries. 
Nobel laureate Robert E. Lucas writes: 
“The consequences for human welfare 
involved in questions like these are 
simply staggering: Once one starts to 
think about them, it is hard to think 
about anything else.”
Economists have studied sources 
of cross-country differences in 
income for more than 200 years. In 
the 1950s, Nobel laureate Robert 
Solow developed a framework for 
growth accounting that has been 
used extensively by economists to 
account for cross-country differences 
in income. Researchers in this field 
have achieved a remarkable degree 
of consensus that differences in per 
capita income across countries don’t 
arise primarily because of differences 
in the quantities of capital or labor but 
rather because of differences in the 
efficiency with which these factors are 
combined. Further research on the 
underlying sources of these differences 
has provided further insights. 
ACCOUNTING FOR CROSS-
COUNTRY DIFFERENCES IN 
INCOME PER CAPITA
Accounting for cross-country 
differences in income is a daunting 
task. Why is one country richer or 
poorer than another? One could 
think of a host of reasons involving 
differences in skills; technologies; 
economic policies; natural 
endowments, including land, climate, 
and the frequency of natural disasters; 
political stability and human rights; 
the role of women in the workforce; 
and many other phenomena.  
Whether studying the reasons 
for changes in Great Britain’s income 
over the course of the Industrial 
Revolution or why Bangladesh is 
poorer than Thailand, economists 
begin by studying production in each 
country.  The total value of all goods 
and services produced in the nation 
— real GDP — can be attributed to 
one of three sources: capital, labor, and 
total factor productivity. The manner 
in which differences in the levels of 
these factors translate into differences 
in real GDP is determined through the 
aggregate production function.  
AGGREGATE PRODUCTION 
FUNCTION
Before describing the production 
function, let’s review the factors 
of production listed above. At the 
simplest level of aggregation, capital 
and labor are arguably always present 
in the production of any commodity — 
whether restaurant meals, economics 
lectures, or other goods and services.  
Capital. Capital is the sum 
of all different types of equipment 
and structures used in production. 
Examples of equipment include 
both ploughs and tractors and both 
motorcycles and buses. This suggests 
the first problem in growth accounting, 
one that affects all of macroeconomics: 
How do you add up different goods 
to arrive at a total stock? If we want a 
single measure of all of the capital in 
the economy, how many ploughs make 
a bus? We need a way to assess the 
value of each commodity. Economists 
often use market prices as a measure 
of value. Thus, if a plough costs 
$1000 and a tractor costs $15,000, 
an economist would assume that the 
value of a tractor, as capital, is 15 times 
the value of a plough. A hypothetical 
economy that had only ploughs and 
tractors, 10 of the first and two of the 
second, would have a total capital 
stock of $40,000.  
Simple aggregation as described 
above cannot be directly applied to 
the measurement of capital because 
we don’t count the quantities of 
different types of capital existing in 
an economy. We don’t know how 
many ploughs there are in Great 
Britain because there is no direct 
measurement of existing stocks. In 
contrast, there is direct measurement 
of flows. We count the output of every 
firm, and thus we have a good estimate 
of how many new ploughs are made 
each year. Thus, while we lack data on 
the stocks of capital, we do have data 
on investment in these stocks.    
Economists infer a measure of 
capital stock through the aggregate 
flow of investment using what is 
known as the perpetual inventory 
method. In its simplest application, 
this assumes that all capital goods 
lose a constant fraction of their value 
as they deteriorate through use.  
Known as physical depreciation, this 
notion captures both breakdowns and 
obsolescence, not only of machinery 
but of all forms of capital. The 
existence of depreciation implies that 
there must be gross investment to 
simply maintain the existing capital 
Whether studying the reasons for changes 
in Great Britain’s income over the course of 
the Industrial Revolution or why Bangladesh 
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stock because some of it is lost each 
year. A conventional estimate of 
the average depreciation rate for the 
United States is around 6 percent.  
The capital stock this year 
is calculated as the sum of the 
nondepreciated fraction of capital from 
last year and current gross investment. 
This method relies on an initial guess 
for capital, but depreciation reduces 
the importance of this guess over 
time. The perpetual inventory method 
determines the total capital stock 
existing today as the weighted sum of 
all past investments, with the weight 
on past investment declining over time 
because of depreciation.      
Aside from physical capital, 
economists have also tried to address 
cross-country differences in intangible 
capital.3 Examples include spending 
on research and development, training 
employees, creating new businesses and 
other forms of organizational capital, 
and the accumulated experience and 
know-how of productive organizations. 
Most of these investments in intangible 
capital are not counted in national 
income and product accounts. This 
omission understates the importance 
of broad capital in production.    
Labor. Labor is as diverse as 
capital. In most studies of cross-
country income differences, labor 
input is measured as the total stock 
of human capital. Human capital is 
simply the quality-adjusted stock of 
workers, just as physical capital is the 
stock of equipment and structures used 
in production. The stock of human 
capital in an economy divided by the 
number of workers gives an average 
measure of the skill of the workforce.   
This leaves open the issue of 
how to measure the average level 
of skills. One common approach 
is to use cross-country data on the 
average years of schooling provided 
by Robert Barro and Jongwha Lee 
in 1993. However, a person’s years 
of schooling are not a measure of 
his or her skill but a measure of the 
quantity of time invested in acquiring 
skills. To convert years of schooling 
into a level of human capital, the 
returns to schooling are often used. 
This approach, developed by Jacob 
Mincer and described in his 1974 
book, assumes that people with 
higher levels of human capital are 
paid higher wages because they are 
more productive in their jobs and, as a 
result, more valuable to their employer. 
By examining the increase in real 
wages arising from an additional year 
of schooling, economists can use what 
are known as Mincerian regressions to 
convert the average years of schooling 
in a country into a measure of average 
human capital per worker. Typical 
estimates of the increase in real wages 
from an additional year of schooling 
are about 10 percent.    
Output. After the measurement 
of inputs, we have to address 
the measurement of output. The 
production of different goods and 
services is summed using market 
prices, whenever possible, as a measure 
of their value. This is similar to the 
approach described to aggregate the 
capital stock. It allows us to arrive at 
aggregate measures of total production 
in economies that produce an amazing 
diversity of goods and services. In what 
follows below, we will use per capita 
GDP, the level of goods and services 
produced per person, interchangeably 
with income per person.4  
Total Factor Productivity. There 
is one last element in the aggregate 
production function. Economists 
have found that two countries with 
identical levels of capital and labor 
do not produce identical levels of 
output. More generally, given the 
stock of capital and labor, the level of 
output produced by these inputs varies 
substantially.5 This variation exists 
both over time within a country and 
across countries at a specific time. This 
phenomenon is described as variation 
in total factor productivity (TFP). TFP 
represents the efficiency with which 
inputs, capital and labor, are used. 
As such, it is often interpreted as a 
measure of the effectiveness of the 
technologies used in an economy. 
Economies with higher TFP are 
believed to produce using more 
efficient technologies that provide 
3 The 2002 book by Stephen Parent and Edward 
Prescott provides a more extensive discussion 
of the issues involving the measurement of 
intangible capital.  They conclude that differ-
ences in intangible capital cannot, by itself, 
explain much of the cross-country differences 
in income.   
4 This is not exactly correct because income per 
person is actually better represented by gross 
national product, or GNP, rather than GDP.  
The difference between these two measures of 
income per person arises when the citizens of a 
nation have sources of income from production 
outside their own nation. Furthermore, in the 
Penn World Tables, the market prices are actu-
ally international prices based on a weighted 
average of prices calculated for each country.
5 This is also known as the Solow residual, since 
it was first isolated by Robert Solow.
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more goods and services for any given 
level of capital and labor.  
TFP is not directly measured. 
Instead, its level is determined by 
dividing GDP by a benchmark level of 
output, that is, the level of output that 
would exist if TFP were one.  
But how do we know the level 
of output when TFP is one? This 
is where the aggregate production 
function enters the analysis, providing 
a benchmark measure of output from 
the factors of production: capital and 
labor. Many forms of the production 
function have been used in economics, 
but growth accounting usually uses the 
Cobb-Douglas production function.  
(See The Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function.)
Permanent increases in an 
economy’s TFP are thought of as 
technological progress. This is because 
such a change implies that the 
economy can produce more output 
using the same stocks of physical 
and human capital. In other words, 
the economy is using a new, more 
productive technology.  
In truth, aside from differences 
in the level of technology, TFP differs 
across countries for many other 
reasons. Differences in other factors of 
production, not directly measured, are 
just one such reason. Thus, the levels 
of raw materials and energy used in 
production are implicitly captured by 
TFP. If two countries have the same 
capital and labor, but the first has 
twice the level of raw materials and 
energy as the second, then TFP will 
be higher in the first country than in 
the second.  As we shall learn below, 
much recent research into growth 
accounting focuses on the causes of 
differences in TFP.      
CROSS-COUNTRY 
DIFFERENCES IN INCOME 
Economists are primarily 
interested in explaining differences in 
income per person, or, more formally, 
real GDP per capita.  It is, of course, 
no mystery if a country twice the size 
of another produces twice as much. 
All else equal, this would arise simply 
because one country had twice the 
number of people, and thus twice 
the workers, of the other. There need 
be no difference in TFP or capital 
per worker. The question of why one 
country contains twice the people 
compared with another country may 
still be of interest to social scientists. 
However, the more limited goal of 
growth accounting is to explain 
differences in income per person.  
A simple reshuffling of the 
aggregate production function allows 
us to attribute production per person 
to either capital per person, TFP, or 
the average level of human capital in 
an economy. In this way, we can use 
the aggregate production function 
described above to break down cross-
country differences in income and, as a 
result, to begin to answer the primary 
The Cobb-Douglas Production Function
W
hen computing the level of output that will be produced given 
a stock of capital and level of labor hours, economists often 
apply a relationship known as the Cobb-Douglas production 
function. If Y is used to denote output, K is the variable that 
represents capital, and L stands for labor, the Cobb-Douglas 
production function is the relationship:  
Here α is a coefficient between 0 and 1 that captures the percentage 
change in output that results from an additional unit of capital. It is also 
known as capital’s share. Similarly, in the above version of the Cobb-Douglas 
function, labor’s share is 1¯α. The sum of shares is then equal to 1, which im-
plies that if we increase both capital and labor by some proportion, output will 
also rise by that same proportion. 
The share term, α, is calculated using data on either the income earned 
by capital or the income earned by labor.  Under the assumption that factors of 
production are paid competitively, the share of total production that is paid to 
labor will equal 1¯α.  
If there is imperfect competition, and firms have monopoly power, then 
1¯α will exceed the share paid to workers.  However, provided we have a mea-
sure of firms’ markups of price over cost, we can still use labor income data to 
derive the coefficient, α.    
Given the direct measurement of output, Y, the capital stock, K, the stock 
of human capital, L, and the coefficient α, the level of TFP is given by A.  It 
is the fraction of output that cannot be explained by the stock of capital and 
labor.
The form of the Cobb-Douglas production function implies that, in 
competitive markets, the share of income paid to capital and labor will be 
constant.  This is broadly supported by empirical evidence showing that, over 
long periods of time, there has been little change to the share of income paid 
to labor and capital.  
Y = AKαL1¯αquestion of economic development: 
Why are some countries richer than 
others?  
Differences in TFP Explain 
Most of the Variation in Income. 
The tangible wealth of a nation is 
contained in its physical capital; 
intangible wealth lies in human 
capital and in TFP. A reader may have 
believed that most of the differences 
in income per person across countries 
may be explained by differences 
either in the quantity of physical 
capital per worker or in the skills of 
the workforce. However, the startling 
finding from growth accounting over 
the past decade is that the majority of 
cross-country differences in income 
per person arise through differences 
in TFP. Most researchers believe that 
measurable inputs such as physical and 
human capital explain less than half 
of the difference in income. Rather, 
it is the level of technology used that 
explains the majority of this difference. 
While the list of researchers who have 
made important contributions to this 
debate is lengthy, three influential 
papers are the 1997 work by Peter 
Klenow and Andrés Rodriguez-
Clare, the 1998 lecture by Edward 
C. Prescott given at the University of 
Pennsylvania, and the 1999 study by 
Robert Hall and Chad Jones. Across 
these studies TFP is found to explain 
between 50 and 75 percent of the 
observed differences in income per 
capita.  
The figure, which is derived using 
data made available by Francesco 
Caselli, shows the relationship between 
TFP and income per capita in 1996. 
As explained by Hall and Jones, 
who derived a similar figure using 
1988 data, the figure shows that the 
differences in income across countries 
is very similar to the corresponding 
differences in total factor productivity 
— that fraction of output that cannot 
be explained by capital and labor. The 
correlation between output per worker 
and total factor productivity exceeds 
80 percent.  
Differences in Capital and Labor 
Are Less Striking. If differences in 
technology, as captured by TFP, are 
the primary determinant of differences 
in income, physical and human 
capital are less important explanatory 
variables. It is certainly true that 
richer economies have more capital 
per worker. However, the extent of the 
cross-country variation in capital per 
worker is not large enough to explain 
most of the observed differences in 
income. To see this, we again use 
the data set developed by Francesco 
Caselli for his chapter in the Handbook 
of Economic Growth. Across the 94 
countries in his sample, the richest 
20 percent had income per capita 
that was almost 22 times that of the 
poorest 20 percent. However, after he 
adjusted for the importance of capital 
in production, the differences in the 
ratio of capital to output across these 
two groups of countries was somewhat 
less than two-fold. 
Still there is more capital used in 
richer countries, and the underlying 
reasons for this are an important issue. 
However, this does not appear to be 
because savings or investment rates are 
higher in richer countries. As shown 
by Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow 
in their 2007 paper, when measured 
using domestic prices, savings rates do 
not vary systematically with average 
income. Instead, it appears that poorer 
countries are less efficient at producing 
investment goods relative to goods 
used for consumption.  
It’s also true that richer countries 
have higher levels of skills per worker.  
However, the Mincerian approach 
to calculating skills does not lead to 
cross-country variation in the stocks 
of human capital, which suggests a 
much larger role for human capital 
in explaining income differences 
than that found for physical capital. 
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FIGURE
Source: Data set from Francesco Caselli “Accounting for Cross Country Differences in Income,” 
and available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/casellif/.
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Returning again to the data used by 
Francesco Caselli, the ratio of average 
human capital in the richest fifth of 
nations, relative to that in the poorest 
fifth, was about two, very similar in 
size to differences in capital.
Adding It All Up. The apparent 
unimportance of measurable inputs 
leads to the following conclusion. In 
general, to explain why one country is 
poorer than another, you must explain 
why it has lower TFP. How large are 
these differences in TFP? The data 
used by Francesco Caselli suggest 
that the ratio of TFP between the 
richest and the poorest 20 percent of 
countries is more than five-fold. When 
taken alongside differences in physical 
and human capital, this explains the 
difference in overall GDP per capita.  
Remember that the ratio of per 
capita income between the richest 
and poorest 20 percent of countries 
is about 20. The Cobb-Douglas 
production function gives us an 
accounting identity that breaks this 
difference down into the product of 
three other ratios: (i) capital divided 
by output and adjusted for a term 
reflecting capital’s share of production, 
(ii) labor, and (iii) TFP. Their values 
are (i) 1.85, (ii) 2.06, and (iii) 5.36 and 
their product is 1.85×2.06×5.36 = 
20.4.6  
Subsequent work re-examining 
the sources of cross-country income 
differences has largely confirmed the 
original findings that TFP explains 
most of the difference we see. In 
reaching this consensus, economists 
have carefully tried to address 
problems that might arise from errors 
present in the measurement of inputs 
and output. These efforts have led to 
better measures of schooling and more 
precise calculations of human capital.  
There have also been corrections 
for the quality of goods and services 
produced in rich and poor countries. 
The implications of different aggregate 
production functions, other than 
the conventional Cobb-Douglas, 
have been studied. Researchers have 
also corrected for different levels of 
market versus home production across 
countries. In poorer economies, more 
goods and services are produced at 
home, using time-intensive methods of 
production, than in the marketplace. 
Omitting the value of such home 
production, which is not included 
in national accounts, exaggerates 
the income disparity between rich 
and poor countries. This research is 
summarized in the survey by Francesco 
Caselli and in Peter Klenow’s 2006 
plenary address to the Society for 
Economic Dynamics.  
EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES
IN TFP
As I’ve described above, a 
consensus has developed on the 
primary importance of cross-country 
differences in TFP for explaining 
differences in income per capita.  
However, the accounting methodology 
used to arrive at this consensus has 
presented a problem. Since TFP is 
inferred as a residual and not directly 
measured as physical or human 
capital are, attributing differences in 
income to differences in TFP does not 
completely answer the question of why 
countries differ. All we have really 
found is that these differences cannot 
be attributed to measured differences 
in physical or human capital. They 
lie somewhere else. Economists have 
started to examine the causes of 
differences in TFP across countries.  
Looking Behind the Aggregate 
Production Function. An important 
early contribution to this research 
was made by Stephen Parente and 
Edward C. Prescott, who, in their 1999 
paper, described how the adoption 
of more productive technologies 
may be hampered because groups 
of people have vested interests in 
protecting existing, but less productive, 
technologies. Following their work, 
a large body of research has arisen.  
Some of this work looks inside the 
production function for the economy. 
This research seeks to examine how 
factors affecting the production 
decisions of individual firms add up to 
differences in output at the aggregate 
level. Instead of attempting a full 
survey of this literature, I mention two 
recent examples.  
One interesting line of research 
studies how taxes and other 
distortions, such as employment 
protection policies, can reduce TFP. 
For example, in their paper, Diego 
Restuccia and Richard Rogerson study 
the effect of taxes and subsidies that 
favor some firms relative to others. 
They find that such policies lead to 
too much capital and labor being 
used by some plants that benefit 
6 The reason that there is a small difference 
between the product of these ratios, which is 
20.4, and the ratio of per capita GDP between 
the poorest and richest 20 percent of econo-
mies, which is 21.82, is somewhat technical. 
This discrepancy, a result of something known 
as Jensen’s inequality, arises because the product 
of the average of the ratios is not equal to the 
average of the product of the ratios.
Subsequent work re-
examining the sources 
of cross-country 
income differences has 
largely conﬁrmed the 
original ﬁndings that 
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from subsidies. By moving capital 
and labor from productive plants to 
unproductive plants, such policies can 
lead to a reduction of between 30 and 
50 percent in an economy’s TFP. This 
research provides an example of how 
TFP is not necessarily determined by 
technological know-how alone but is 
also affected by economic policies.      
Amartya Lahiri and Kei-Mu Yi 
also emphasize the role of economic 
policies in explaining the different 
economic performance of two Indian 
states, West Bengal and Maharashtra.  
Economic development in these two 
states poses an interesting puzzle.  In 
1960 West Bengal’s GDP per capita 
exceeded that of Maharashtra, but by 
1993 its GDP was barely two-thirds 
that of Maharashtra. Lahiri and Yi 
use this case study as a means to 
get behind the aggregate production 
function. In their model, there are 
separate production functions for 
agriculture, manufacturing, and 
services. They conclude that West 
Bengal has fallen behind Maharashtra 
because TFP in manufacturing and 
services has grown more slowly. 
Returning to our language above, 
there has been less technological 
progress in West Bengal. Lahiri and 
Yi suggest that growth in TFP has 
been lower in West Bengal because 
labor and industrial regulations have 
hindered growth in business TFP. In 
general, policies that stifle innovation 
or the adoption of new, more efficient 
technologies slow TFP growth. This, 
in turn, reduces the growth of income 
per capita. 
Re-examining the Role 
of Human Capital. Recently, 
researchers have begun to question the 
importance of TFP.  In two separate 
papers, Rodolfo Manuelli and Ananth 
Seshadri and, separately, Andres 
Erosa, Tatyana Koreshkova, and Diego 
Restuccia have argued that human 
capital has not been properly measured 
in existing studies.  
They have two main insights. The 
first is that human capital investment 
in a country is not independent of the 
level of TFP. Second, they argue that 
human capital investment requires 
not only years of schooling but also 
goods and services such as schools and 
teachers. This, in turn, suggests that 
years of schooling are an incomplete 
measure of human capital because 
the quality of the human capital is 
neglected.
Households make educational 
investments based on the returns to 
education, and these investments 
involve not only the time spent in 
school but also real goods devoted 
to education. This implies that 
the standard Mincerian approach 
to inferring the stock of human 
capital may understate cross-
country differences. These authors 
argue that a different approach to 
measuring human capital, one where 
households explicitly undertake 
schooling decisions that vary across 
countries in response to the economic 
environment, leads to much larger 
differences in quality-adjusted human 
capital across countries. This, in 
turn, reduces the direct role of TFP. 
Indeed, they find that cross-country 
differences in human capital are 
the leading source of differences in 
income.  However, it remains true that 
these differences in human capital are 
driven by differences in TFP. It’s just 
that the required differences in TFP 
become far smaller. 
 
CONCLUSION
Economists account for cross-
country differences in income per 
person using the method known as 
growth accounting. It breaks down 
real GDP per capita into capital per 
worker, human capital per worker, and 
the level of technology, or TFP. TFP 
is the level of output that remains to 
be explained after accounting for the 
role of physical and human capital. 
Measuring the levels of these inputs 
across countries, we find that most of 
the cross-country variation in income 
per person is attributable to differences 
in TFP. Poorer economies are poorer 
not because they have less capital and 
lower skills per worker but because 
they use these inputs less efficiently 
than wealthier economies. 
Many things can affect a nation’s 
TFP. For example, economic policies, 
such as taxes or subsidies, may impede 
the efficient distribution of capital 
and labor across firms, which will 
lower TFP. Alternatively, they may 
prevent the adoption of the most 
efficient technologies and thus lower 
TFP. However, to the extent that 
the technology is much more readily 
transferable across countries than 
physical or human capital, why would 
one country suffer the loss in output 
associated with using an inferior 
technology? If, instead, TFP differs 
because of policies that hinder the 
growth of business, why allow such 
policies to persist when the gains to 
correcting them are so large? B RREFERENCES
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